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I  is good ha  o  ook p philosoph , I sa . Am I asser ing some fac  o be he
case; or e pressing, non-asser oricall , m a al of he fac  ha  o  ook p
philosoph ? Acco n s of he la er kind ha e seemed a rac i e o man
philosophers, in e hics and else here. Sen en ial opera ors s ch as I  is r e ha  ... ,
I  is kno n ha  ...  and I  is probable ha  ...  ha e been claimed o req ire
analogo s rea men .
In Fregean erms, ha  is in q es ion in each of hese cases is he her he dis inc i e
fea re of he meaning of sen ences formed b  he se of one hese opera ors is o be
cons r ed as a fea re of e e, or as one of f ce. Here I shall be disc ssing a general
objec ion o he la er ans er, d e in par  o Frege, and e ended b  Geach and b
Searle. If s ccessf l, he objec ion o ld grea l  res ric  he possible se of
dis inc ions of force in a heor  of meaning. B  I shall arg e ha  he arg men  is b
no means concl si e; and hence ha  i  is possible ha  force, or some hing like i ,
co ld pla  a far more impor an  par  in an adeq a e acco n  of meaning han has
s all  been ho gh .
I
The arg men  begins b  obser ing ha  acco n s of he disp ed pe
charac eris icall  propose an in erpre a ion of j s  hose (ca ical) sen ences or
erances in hich cons r c ions of he rele an  pe  I  is probable ha  ... , I  is
good ha  ... , I  is r e ha  ... , or ha e er  are no  par  of an  cla se o her han a
comple e sen ence. I  is no ed ha  here are man  o her ( b idia ) occ rrences of
s ch cons r c ions, and arg ed ha  he proposed acco n s are nable o deal i h a
leas  some of he: ne  cases, ho gh obliged o do so. As Geach sa s, heories of
non-descrip i e performances reg larl  ake in o acco n  onl  he se of a erm P
o call some hing P ; he corrobora ion heor  of r h, for e ample, considers onl
he se of r e  o call a s a emen  r e, and he condemna ion heor  of bad
1 This piece as ri en ci ca 1982 83, dra ing in par  on ma erial from m  PhD hesis (The
P blem f he Si gle Ca e, Cambridge, 1981). In he hesis I proposed ha  o ld no  be
called an e pressi is  acco n  of j dgemen s of he form I  is probable ha . One chap er,
on hich his paper b ilds, ried o defend he ie  agains  he Frege-Geach arg men . This
piece earned a re ise and res bmi  from Phil hical Re ie , b  as ne er res bmi ed.
Par s of i  made heir a  in o m  Seman ic Minimalism and he Frege Poin , in
Tsoha idis, S.L.(ed.), F da i  f S eech Ac The : Phil hical a d Li g i ic Pe ec i e ,
Ro ledge, 1994, pp. 132 55 (reprin ed in Na ali m i h  Mi , O ford, 2011, ch. 3) 
ho gh ha  paper fa o rs a di eren  approach o he Frege-Geach arg men , leaning more
hea il  on seman ic minimalism. I m p ing his piece online o facili a e self-ci a ion.
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considers onl  he a  i  is sed o call some hing bad; predica ions of r e  and
bad  in if or he cla ses, or in he cla ses of a disj nc ion, are j s  ignored.  One
co ld no  ri e o  s ch ses of he erms , Geach con in es, as calling for a di eren
e plana ion from heir se o can hings r e or bad  for ha  o ld mean ha
arg men s of he pa ern if is r e (if is bad), hen ; b is r e ( is bad); e g
 con ained a fallac  of eq i oca ion, hereas in fac  he  are clearl  alid.  [1]
Searle s ersion of he arg men  is some ha  di eren , in ha  he admi s a possibili
hich Geach s appeal o he alidi  of m d  e o ld appear o e cl de.
Searle is objec ing o ha  he calls he eech ac  a al is of ords s ch as  good  ,
r e ,  kno  and  probabl ; he general form of hich he akes o be: The ord W
is sed o perform he speech ac A.  Searle sa s ha  an  anal sis of he meaning of
a ord (or morpheme) m s  be consis en  i h he fac  ha  he same ord (or
morpheme) can mean he same hing in all he gramma icall  di eren  kinds of
sen ences in hich i  can occ r.  For e ample, he ord r e  means or can mean
he same hing in in erroga i es, indica i e condi ionals, nega ions, disj nc ions,
op a i es, e c.  [2]
Ho e er, Searle recognises ha  in order o mee  his condi ion of adeq ac , speech
ac  anal s s are no  commi ed o he ie  ha  e er  li eral erance of W is a
performance of A, b  ra her [ma  claim] ha  erances hich are no  performances
of he ac  ha e o be e plained in erms of erances hich are.  [3] Searle h s
appears o ackno ledge ha  i  need no  be said ha  he con rib ion he cla se
makes o he meaning of a condi ional in hich i  occ rs as an eceden  is ide ical o
he meaning i  has hen sed canonicall ; b  onl  ha  he former con rib ion
depends in a r le-go erned a  ( he r le associa ed i h he condi ional form) on
he meaning he cla se has in he la er case. If Geach s appeal o alidi  ere
s ccessf l, his ie  o ld seem n enable. The alidi  of m d  e o ld
depend on he meaning of s ch a cla se being in arian  be een he o con e s.
Ha ing admi ed his possibili , ho e er, Searle fails o ake ad an age of i .
Ha ing said ha  he speech ac  anal s s ... need o sho  ... onl  ... ha  li eral
erances hich are no  performances of ac A s and in a rela ion o performances of
A in a a  hich is p rel  a f nc ion of he a  he sen ences ered s and in
rela ion o he s andard indica i e sen ences, in he erance of hich he ac
performed , Searle akes his o mean ha  if s ch sen ences are in he pas  ense,
hen he ac  is repor ed in he pas ; if he  are h po he ical hen he ac  is
h po hesi ed, e c. .[4] He concl des, correc l , ha  he speech ac  anal sis of he ...
ords: good , r e , probable , e c. does no  sa isf  his condi ion. If his is
good, hen e o gh  o b  i , is no  eq i alen  o If I commend his, hen e o gh
o b  i .   This sed o be good  is no  eq i alen  o I sed o commend his ;  and
so on. Searle himself does no  can as o her a s in hich he meaning of cla ses
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s ch as I  is good ha  in ario s con e s ma  be s s ema icall  rela ed o heir
meaning hen he  s and alone. B  i  is clear ha  if he general objec ion is o be
ans ered, he sol ion ill lie in his direc ion. The arg men  from m d  e is
claimed o bar he a . Le  s es  i s s reng h.
II
As Geach no es, his arg men  is d e originall  o Frege, ho ses i  in arg ing ha
a sen en ial nega ion opera or canno  be cons r ed as a sign of force; as an indica ion
ha  a sen ence, hen ered, has he force of a de ial. Frege s arg men  is in o
par s: (i) he no es ha  a nega ed sen ence ma  occ r as he an eceden  of a
condi ional, here i  does no  amo n  o a denial, and concl des ha  in s ch a case
he nega ion con rib es o he sense of (or ho gh  e pressed b ) he an eceden ;
and (ii) he sa s ha  if e an  o allo  ha  a case of mod s ponens in ol ing s ch
a condi ional is alid, e shall ha e o allo  ha  he nega ion does no  mark a
denial, e en hen he nega ed sen ence concerned s ands alone. [5]
In (ii), he arg men  is pres mabl  no  ha  he alidi  of m d  e depends on
he meaning of he an eceden  cla se in he rs  premiss being e ac l he same as i
is hen he cla se occ rs alone (as in he second premiss). Tr e, i  o ld follo  ha
beca se he nega i e cla se is no  a denial in he former con e , i  is no  a denial in
he la er. B  he same arg men  o ld sho  ha  hen he cla se s ands alone i
does no  ha e he force of an asser ion; for i  lacks his force hen sed as an
an eceden .
Ra her, he arg men  appears o depend on he claim ha  he inference
(1) If no - hen ; no - ; herefore
is alid onl  if he second premiss has he same sense (or e presses he same
ho gh ) as he an eceden  of condi ional forming he rs  premiss. If so, hen
beca se (according o (i)) he nega ion opera or in he rs  premiss con rib es o he
sense of he sense of he an eceden , i s role in de ermining he meaning of he
second premiss m s  also be o modif  sense, ra her han o indica e force. So e en in
canonical cases, he nega ion opera or canno  be held o modif  force.
In o her ords, he p rpose of he appeal o m d e is o e end he concl sion
of (i) o canonical ses of he nega ion opera or (and similarl  for o her opera ors, in
Geach s case). B  ho  is he req iremen  of iden i  of sense o be j s i ed? No , on
he face of i , b  Geach s remark ha  o her ise he inference o ld con ain a fallac
of eq i oca ion. For i  is no more clear ha  s ch a fallac  ill necessaril  res l  from
a di erence of sense han ha  i  ill res l  from he ackno ledged di erence of
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force (i.e., from he fac  ha  onl  in he second premiss does he cla se ha e
asser oric force).
Frege and Geach do ha e ano her arg men  for req iring s ch iden i  of sense in
inference (1): o no e ha  e e iden l  do ha e i  in
(2) If hen ; ; herefore
( here is no  nega ed); and o reason ha  if (1) is o e emplif  he same form of
inference, e m s  ha e i  here also. No , his is an appeal no  o a necessar
condi ion for alidi , b  o he desirabili  of a niform e plana ion of he alidi
of a class of inferences ha ing a s r c ral proper  in common. Moreo er, al ho gh
s ch a goal is indeed desirable, i  doesn'  follo   as Geach and Frege e iden l
concl de  ha  (1) need be rea ed as a special case of (2). (1) and (2) migh  be
cons r ed as dis inc  s b pes of a single more general form of inference. I  is no
ob io s ha  in ha  case he general cri erion alidi  o ld incl de he req ired
iden i  of sense. There migh  ra her be some more general condi ion hich red ced
o iden i  of sense in he special case of (2).
In an  case, he se Frege and Geach make of he req iremen  of iden i  of sense
depends on heir claim ha  in he an eceden  of a condi ional a nega ion opera or (or
one of o her opera ors consick b  Geach) does modif  sense. This he  infer from he
obser a ion ha  in s ch a con e  s ch an opera or does no  ac  as a force indica or,
in he a  proposed i h respec  o canonical con e s. As e shall see, his is a
nonseq i r. I  ass mes ha  here is no a  o make sense of an occ rrence of a
force-indica or in a s bsidiar  con e ; hereas i  is far from clear ha  his is so. In
order o make sense of s ch an occ rrence, i  is no  necessar  o sa  ha  s bsidiar
ses of cla ses of he form No -  ( o ake Frege s e ample) are li erall  denials. I  is
eno gh ha  heir con rib ion o he meaning of he en ire sen ence in hich he
occ r depends on he fac  ha  s ch a cla se does amo n  o a denial, hen sed
canonicall . For hen here is a clear reason for incl ding a force-indica or for denial
in he s bsidiar  posi ions concerned: in order o sho  ha  he cla se o ld ha e
his force, if ered alone.
In he ne  sec ion I shall o line an acco n  of his kind. I  rns o  ha  i  does
ield iden i  of sense be een he o occ rrences of No -  in (1). B  his is no
help o Frege and Geach, for he acco n  e ades he rs  par  of heir arg men , on
hich, as e ha e seen, he concl sion of heir appeal o m d  e depends.
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III
I shall largel  presen  he acco n  in erms of probabilis ic sen en ial opera ors, s ch
as I  is probable ha  ...  (in hich class I ha e a special in eres , ha ing arg ed
else here ha  erances s ch I  is probable ha  are no  asser ions [6]). The
proposal begins i h he claim ha  an erance of he form P , here P is s ch an
opera or and an appropria e sen ence, is ha  ma be called a a ial a e i .
Par ial asser ion is held o be a ca egor  of force, of hich asser ion as s all
concei ed ( f ll asser ion ) ma  be a limi ing case. The general ca egor  is
charac erised b  he s ip la ion ha  par ial asser ions are hose erances hich
s and o par ial beliefs, or degrees of con dence, as f ll asser ions s and o f ll
beliefs. [7] A f ll asser ion ha charac eris icall e presses i s speaker s f ll belief
ha (and in s i able circ ms ances ill lead a hearer o adop  a f ll belief ha ).
Analogo sl , a par ial belief ha charac eris icall e presses i s speaker s par ial
belief (of some degree) ha (and in s i able circ ms ances ill lead a hearer o
adop  he same par ial belief ha ).
Wha  concerns s here is no  he her his is an adeq a e approach o he meaning of
he probabilis ic erms of na ral lang age, b  he fac  ha  b  charac erising force in
erms of an associa ed pe of proposi ional a i de, i  can escape he Frege
objec ion. The s ra eg  req ires ha  indica i e condi ionals hemsel es be rea ed
non-asser oricall . A sincere erance of If hen  is said o indica e ha  a speaker
possesses ha  ma  be called an inferen ial disposi ion: a men al s a e s ch ha  he
ere o adop  he men al a i de associa ed i h he erance , he  o ld be
led o adop  he men al a i de associa ed i h . For e ample, If i  is probable
ha  i  is going o sno , hen Boris ill be learning o ski , e presses a disposi ion o
infer from a s rong par ial belief ha  i  is going o sno , o a f ll belief ha  Boris is
learning o ski.
This s gges ion pro ides a clear sense in hich he e pression I  is probable ha  ...
makes he same con rib ion o a canonical erance, as o a condi ional erance in
hich i  occ rs in he an eceden  or conseq en . In each case i  marks he associa ion
of he meaning of he hole erance i h a cer ain kind of men al a i de: namel
a s rong par ial belief. O her fea res of he occ rrence of he e pression in each case,
de ermine rs  hich par ic lar s rong par ial belief is in ol ed (i.e., i s con en ); and
secondl , ho  his par ial belief s ands in rela ion o he men al s a e associa ed i h
he erance as a hole. In he canonical case he fac  ha  I  is probable ha  ...  is
he o ermos  opera or indica es ha  he la er men al s a e is j s  he par ial belief
i self. While in he condi ional case, he occ rrence of he e pression in (sa ) he
an eceden  posi ion indica es ha  possession of he par ial belief in q es ion is he
an eceden  condi ion of he inferen ial disposi ion associa ed i h he condi ional.
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(This process of de ermina ion ma  be i era ed, if he condi ional i self occ rs as a
componen  of some larger erance.)
I  is impor an  o dis ing ish his s gges ion from he claim ha  a condi ional e
a speaker s possession of s ch an inferen ial disposi ion. For if ha  ere so, a
condi ional erance o ld be an asser ion ab i s speaker s s a e of mind, and
o ld be false if and onl  if he speaker concerned did no  ha e s ch an inferen ial
disposi ion. B  he proposal is s pposed o in erpre  he indica i e condi ionals of
na ral lang age; and in prac ice ha  speakers indica e b  sa ing Tha s false  in
response o s ch erance is no  ha  he  don'  belie e he original speaker has he
s a e of mind in q es ion, b  ha  (e en ha ing heard he erance) he  don'  ha e
i  hemsel es. Similarl  he response Tha s r e  indica es ha  a hearer has he
inferen ial disposi ion in q es ion, and no  ha  he  ake he speaker o do so. So o
claim ha  a condi ional repor s i s speaker s possession of s ch a disposi ion, is o be
forced o ackno ledge ha  he erms r e  and false  are applied o s ch erances
in a non-s andard a ; e en ho gh o make his claim is o rea  hese erances as
asser ions.
For he same reason i  is impor an  no  o in erpre  he condi ional If i  is probable
ha , hen  as If I ere o par iall  asser (s rongl ) ha , hen I o ld asser  ha
.  This seems o be ha  a s gges ion of D mme s (in response o Geach s
arg men ) o ld amo n  o, for he probabili  case [8]. No e ha  o rejec  his
reading is no  o den  ha  someone ho has he disposi ion o infer from a s rong
par ial belief ha o a f ll belief ha , o ld, if he  ere o par iall  asser
(sincerel , and o a s i abl  high degree) ha , be a  leas  illing o asser  ha ; b
simpl  o sa  ha  If i  is probable ha , hen  is no  a s a emen  ha  his is he
case.
L. J. Cohen has poin ed o  ha  if D mme s reading is o appl  he probabili
case, here sho ld be a se for a cons r c ion
meaning If I ere o asser  (agree) g ardedl  ha A, hen I sho ld asser
(agree) ha B . B  his o ld no  be a se paraphrasable b  If i  is probable
ha A, hen B . For ho gh i  happens o be r e ha  if I ere o asser  (agree)
g ardedl  ha  i  ill be clo d  his af ernoon I sho ld also asser  (agree) ha
I am e cessi el  ca io s in m  ea her predic ions, i  is no  r e ha  if
clo ds are probable hen I am e cessi el  ca io s. [9]
On he presen  ie , ho e er, he condi ional If I ere o asser  g ardedl  ha A,
hen I sho ld asser  ha B  is associa ed i h a disposi ion o infer from a belief ha
one has asser ed g ardedl  ha A o a belief ha one has asser ed (or ill asser )
ha B. There is no hing o pre en  someone from holding his disposi ion, b  no  a
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disposi ion o infer from a high degree of par ial belief ha A o a belief ha B; and i
is his la er disposi ion hich his ie  associa es i h he condi ional If i  is
probable ha A, hen B.  [10]
IV
In he proposed acco n , I  is probable ha  ...  does no  modif  sense, e en hen
sed as he an eceden  of a condi ional. So bo h occ rrences of he probabilis ic
cla se in
(3) If i  is probable ha hen ; i  is probable ha ; herefore
ha e he same sense: ha  of  i self. The claim on hich Frege and Geach s appeal
o m d  e as seen o depend is h s alida ed; b  no  in s ch a a  as o
licence heir concl sion ( hich depended on he claim ha  in he s bsidiar  posi ion
he opera or does modif  sense).
Ho e er, s ch force-modi er acco n s do ha e a problem i h alidi , in ha  he
seem incompa ible i h he s andard rea men  of his no ion. The s al acco n  of
alidi  relies on he no ion of r h; hereas in r ling ha  ario s pes of
erances are no  asser ions, a force-modi er acco n  appears commi ed o sa ing
ha  hese erances are nei her r e nor false, a  leas  in he req ired sense. In his
sec ion, concen ra ing on Frege s e ample, I an  o men ion an approach o alidi
hich does seem compa ible i h a force-modi er acco n .
Ideall , he approach o ld rel  on he follo ing claims: he men al s a e he abo e
acco n  akes o be associa ed i h a correc  and sincere erance of he rs
premiss of he inference (2) is s ch ha  an one possessing bo h his men al s a e and
ha  associa ed i h a correc  and sincere erance of he second premiss, ill come
o adop  he men al s a e associa ed i h he concl sion. The adop ion of he la er
men al s a e ill no  be a ma er of choice for he person concerned, b  ra her he
res l  of he realisa ion of he an eceden  condi ions of a disposi ion. The inference
form is herefore alid in ir e of a rela ion a  he men al le el, be een he s a e of
mind associa ed i h i s premisses and ha  associa ed i h i s concl sion.
These claims are ac all  oo s rong. In so far as he  are correc , ho e er, i  is
irrele an  he her and are f ll asser ions (associa ed i h f ll beliefs) or par ial
asser ions (associa ed i h par ial beliefs); or, indeed, he her and belong o an
ca egor  of force de ned in he same general a , so long as he associa ed pe of
men al a i de can form he an eceden  or conseq en  condi ion an inferen ial
disposi ion. (This appears o be a er  broad class indeed.) Hence he acco n
pro ides a niform e plana ion of he alidi  of m d  e , applicable eq all  o
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cases in hich he second premiss is asser oric in force, and cases in hich i  is no .
In Frege s case i  enables s o rea  No -  as a de ial ha (associa ed i h a
disbelief ha ), i ho  commi ing s o a di eren e plana ion of he o
inferences (1) and (2). Ins ances of m d  e in ol ing a nega i e second premiss
fall nder niform principle eq all  applicable o he posi i e (or asser oric) case.
To describe his niform principle, ho e er, e req ire a dis inc ion no  admi ed b
Frege, be een ac i e and a i e occ rrences of a force indica or (in canonical and
s bsidiar  con e s, respec i el ). The general req iremen  for he alidi  of an
inference p rpor ing o be an ins ance of m d  e is hen ha  he an eceden  of
he condi ional premiss sho ld ha e bo h he same sense and he same force as he
non-condi ional premiss; ho gh ha e er force his is ill be sed passi el  in he
rs  case and ac i el  in he second. For hose ins ances of m d  e in hich he
second premiss and he concl sion ha e asser oric force, his condi ion red ces, in
e ec , o ha  of iden i  of sense; i.e., o he condi ion endorsed b  Geach and Frege.
From he presen  poin  of ie , heir mis ake consis s in aking his class o be
ni ersal, hereas in fac  i  is a special case.
T o q ali ca ions: rs , a lo  more needs o be said before he acco n  gi en here of
he correc ness of m d  e can be bro gh  nder a general heor  of alid
inference. The general projec  o ld mos  pla sibl  ake he form of a r le-b -r le
j s i ca ion of a s i able na ral ded c ion s s em. For each r le, he aim o ld be
o pro ide a j s i ca ion analogo s o ha  here o ered for m d  e ; i.e., ideall ,
an acco n  hich demons ra es ha  a person ho has he men al s a es or a i des
aken o be associa ed i h he premisses of he r le in q es ion, ill also ha e ha
associa ed i h i s concl sion. The na re of he demons ra ion ma  di er from r le
o r le. The simples  case ill perhaps be ha  of Conj nc ion Elimina ion: he r le
hich j s i es he inference
(4) and ; herefore .
Here he men al s a e associa ed i h he premiss ill simpl  be he combina ion of
hose associa ed i h i s conj nc s; and possession of his combina ion g aran ees a
person s possession of bo h of i s componen s indi id all  (and hence of he former
componen , in par ic lar). No e, ho e er, ha  in his case g aran ee  has a sense
signi can l  di eren  from ha  in hich he possession of he men al s a e
associa ed i h he premisses of mod s ponens as said o g aran ee ha
associa ed i h i s concl sion. I don'  hink ha  his is an objec ion o he approach,
for here seems o be no reason o insis  ha  all ded c ions r les be j s i ed in
e ac l  he same a . (On he con rar , he fac  ha  here has been m ch disp e
abo  he accep abili  of some s ch r les b  no  o hers, s gges s ha  here are
di erences in he gro nds on hich he  rel .) Ho e er i  does call a en ion o a
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major o ersimpli ca ion in he abo e acco n , and h s o he need for a second
q ali ca ion.
I  is clear ha  speakers do no  dra  all he logical conseq ences of heir ario s
beliefs. A realis ic acco n  ill herefore ha e o admi  ha  he s gges ed g aran ee
is an idealisa ion. A person ho ers a condi ional ma , kno ingl  or o her ise,
no  ac all  ha e he associa ed  inferen ial disposi ion. This aside, he disposi ions
o inference ha  people ha e are er  imperfec . Their e ec i eness seems o depend
par ic larl  on he e en  o hich he disposi ion and i s an eceden  men al a i de
are bo h conscio sl  held, a  he same ime. This admission raises se eral problems.
(Wha  is for s ch a men al s a e o be conscio sl  held, for e ample?) B  i  is
do b f l he her hese i ia e he approach. Af er all, m ch of he sef lness of
s ch respec able no ions as belief and par ial belief in e plana or  models of
ling is ic and non-ling is ic beha io r, depends on similar simpli ca ions. In he
presen  case, i  ma  h s be claimed ha  he di erence be een alidi  and
in alidi , ho gh no  acc ra el  marked in he ho gh  processes of an  ac al
person, is re ealed in he a  s gges ed in an ideal model; o hich o r ac al
ho gh  processes do in impor an  a s appro ima e.
V
Cla ses of s ch forms as No -  and I  is probable ha  ha e man  s bsidiar
occ rrences in  na ral lang age, apar  from hose in hich he  form he an eceden
or conseq en  of a condi ional. If he approach s gges ed here is o form he basis of
an adeq a e heor  of meaning for na ral lang age, i  ill be req ired o o er he
same kind of e plana ion for each of hese s bsidiar  con e s as i  does for he
condi ional case. These e plana ions are bo nd o be a case-b -case a air. Here I
shall indica e ho  he acco n  migh  go in ha  is perhaps he mos  impor an  case
 ha  of nega ion  and nish i h son remarks abo  he rea men  of o her
proposi ional connec i es. I  o ld be s rprising if his disc ssion ere o con ince
a scep ical reader of he iabili  of he force-modi er approach; b  I hope i  ill
demons ra e ha  i  is far from clear ha  addi ional cases ill pro ide an
ins rmo n able obs acle.
The rea men  of sen en ial nega ion in a force-modi er acco n  is bo h di c l  and
cr cial: cr cial, beca se nega ion is s ch a cen ral logical opera ion. And di c l ,
beca se in rejec ing Frege s arg men  o he e ec  ha  he nega ion opera or
modi es sense, e ha e lef  open he q es ion as o he her, in general, he nega ion
opera or is o be cons r ed as a sign of de ial (or he her i  does, af er all, modif
sense). The force-modi er rea men  is less pla sible for nega ion han for some
o her opera ors, beca se i  is arg able ha  he er  admission ha  here is s ch an
ac i i  as denial, opposed o asser ion, pro ides a na ral acco n  of he sense
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modi ca ion e ec ed b  a nega ion. Brie , he arg men  is ha  once denial is
recognised as an ac i i  dis inc  from asser ion, hen i  is open o s o ake asser ion
condi ions and denial condi ions oge her o  he sense of an asser oric erance.
I  is hen possible o ake he sense of No -  o be rela ed o ha  of  b  he
con en ion ha  heir asser ion and denial condi ions are re ersed. [11] This acco n
depends on ha  ma  be called he c m leme a i f a e i : he fac  ha  in
den ing, or disagreeing i h, an asser ion made b  ano her speaker, one e ec i el
makes an asser ion oneself. This is far from being a ri ial proper  of asser ion. [12]
To e plain i  in erms compa ible i h he proposed force-modi er acco n , i  is
necessar  o ask ha  gi es an erance asser oric force.
On he acco n  s gges ed abo e, di erences of force are linked o di erences in he
pes of men al a i de i h hich erances are charac eris icall  associa ed.
Asser ions are said o be dis ing ished b  being charac eris icall  he e pressions of
(e ec i el ) f ll beliefs. No  s ppose a f ll belief ha is cons r ed, i e  alia, as a
beha io ral disposi ion: ro ghl , as he disposi ion o ass me ha in deciding ho
o ac  (in calc la ing e pec ed ili ies). This amo n s o a propensi  o ignore
possible o comes of one s ac ions, e cep  hose hich depend on i s being he case
ha ( hene er one akes i  o make a di erence o he o come of some ac ion
he her ). This kind of beha io ral disposi ion has a na ral complemen : he
disposi ion o ignore he complemen ar  class of possibili ies (in ha  class of cases in
hich i  is held o be rele an  he her ). The complemen is i self a f ll belief.
Ho e er, is i  he righ  f ll belief o be associa ed i h an asser ion of he nega ion
of he asser oric sen ence ?
The fac  ha  a f ll belief, beha io rall  cons r ed, has a na ral complemen , does
no  e plain h  he de ial of an e pression of s ch a belief sho ld amo n  o he
e pression of he complemen ar  belief. I  on'  do o sa  ha  his is j s  ha  a
denial of an asser ion is, if a  he same ime e ish o make se of he no ion of
denial as a par ial de erminan  of sense. For h  sho ld ha  par iall  de ermines
sense be he condi ions for e pression of he complemen ar  belief?
In order o ans er his, no e ha  in na ral lang age here is a dis inc ion be een
decli i g  ag ee i h, and di ag eei g i h, an erance made b  ano her speaker.
The former is appropria e hen one does no  accep  ha  he asser ion condi ions of
he erance in q es ion hold; he la er, ro ghl , hen one hinks ha  condi ions
are realised hich are i c m a ible i h accep ance of he asser ion in q es ion. The
la er form of disagreemen  is he one marked b  he se of he repl  Tha s false , in
response o a pre io s asser ion. I  seems o me ha  i  is his form of dissen  hich
permi s s o dra  dis inc ion be een making an asser ion he cer ain condi ions
hold, and making an asser ion ha he  hold. For he o asser ions  and I  is
asser ible ha  ha e essen iall  he same asser ion condi ions b  di er sharpl  in
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heir denial condi ions. One ma  legi ima el  disagree (in he s rong sense) ha  i
asser ible ha , i ho  disagreeing ha ; b in declining o agree ha  i  is
asser ible ha , one e ec i el  commi s oneself o declining o agree i h an
asser ion ha . So if a lang age ere o lack he facili  for indica ing disagreemen s
of he s rong kind, i s asser ions o ld no  be dis ing ishable from simple
indica ions ha  speakers ook cer ain condi ions o hold. There o ld hen be no
apparen  se for a no ion of sense dis inc  from ha  of asser ion condi ions (and no
reason, I hink, o dis ing ish r h from asser ibili ). [13]
The s rong form of disagreemen  is ha  associa ed i h he nega ion opera or: he
asser ion condi ions of No -  are he condi ions for disagreemen  (in he s rong
sense) i h an asser ion ha (and ice e a). B  ha  is he incompa ibili  on
hich s rong disagreemen  depends? I  seems o me ha  i  is precisel  ha  be een
a f ll belief and i s complemen ; be een ass ming ha , and r ling o  he
possibili  ha , in assessing he o comes of one s possible ac ions. If so, hen here
is a clear basis for he associa ion of he nega i e par  of ha  he presen  acco n
akes o de ermine sense (i.e., dissen  condi ions) i h he na ral complemen  of an
asser ion. For in order ha  he holding of hese dissen  condi ions sho ld be aken o
be i c m a ible i h an accep ance of he asser ion concerned, he belief hich he
lead a speaker has o be ha  associa ed i h he complemen  of ha  asser ion; in
o her ords he complemen  of he belief of hich he original asser ion is
charac eris icall  he e pression.
This disc ssion arose from o r recogni ion of he need for a force-modi er approach
o meaning o pro ide an acco n  of he nega ion of asser oric sen ences, capable on
he one hand of being generalised o erances of non-asser oric force; and on he
o her of doing j s ice o he in i ion ha  a nega ed asser ion is i self an asser ion.
We ha e concl ded ha  he la er in i ion is ell-fo nded, res ing on he fac  ha
an asser ion has a na ral complemen . And e ha e indica ed a pla sible
j s i ca ion for he iden i ca ion of he denial of an asser oric sen ence i h he
asser ion of he complemen  of ha  sen ence, and hence e plained ho  in he
asser oric case a force-modif ing nega ion opera or can ha e an e ec  on meaning
iden ical o a change in sense.
VI
Ho  does his acco n  generalise o erances o her han asser ions? Here I shall
consider onl  he case of par ial asser ions: erances q ali ed b  a probabilis ic
sen en ial opera or, s ch as I  is probable ha  ... . No  an erance s ch as I  is no
probable ha , or he response No  o he q es ion Is i  probable ha , is s all
eq i alen  o he s a emen  I  is improbable ha ; i.e., o I  is probable ha  no - .
In s ch cases he nega ion occ rs i hin he scope of he probabilis ic force modi er,
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and so doesn'  presen  an  ne  problem. Ne er heless, here are cases in hich a
denial applies o a par ial asser ion. Consider he e change: I  is er  probable ha
Boris has learned o ski ; No i  isn' ; in fac  i  is ra her nlikel  ha  he has done so .
Can he par ial asser ion acco n  e plain he con rib ion of he (implici ) cla se I
is er  probable ha  Boris has learned o ski  o he meaning of he rs  par  of he
repl  ( he par  in hich his cla se is modi ed b  a nega ion opera or)? And in so
doing, can i  generalise he abo e acco n  of he denial of an asser oric sen ence?
The simples  approach is o sa  ha  he denial of a par ial asser ion e presses a
speaker s recogni ion ha  he or she possesses an a i de incompa ible i h he
par ial belief e pressed b  ha  par ial asser ion. Ho e er, he no ion of
incompa ibili  needed here is no  q i e ha  e ha e seen o be in ol ed in he f ll
asser ion case. For here are man  par ial beliefs incompa ible i h an  gi en one:
an  par ial belief i h he same con en  b  di eren  degree, in fac . The s gges ion
is ha  he applica ion of a sen en ial nega ion opera or o a par ial asser ion  is
charac eris icall  a means of indica ing ha  one holds some one of his range of
par ial beliefs, incompa ible i h ha  hich o ld ordinaril  be e pressed b  
i self. B  since No -  does no  e press an  par ic lar par ial belief, i  is no  in i self
a par ial asser ion. In he case of f ll asser ions, in con ras , he se of a nega ed
sen ence No -  charac eris icall  signi es ha a speaker has a par ic lar f ll belief,
incompa ible i h ha  hich he nnega ed erance  o ld ordinaril  e press:
i.e., he complemen  of he belief e pressed b  .
Wh  sho ld he eaker no ion of incompa ibili , associa ed i h par ial asser ions,
no  also be sed in he f ll asser ion case? Isn'  a eak par ial belief (sa ) ha j s
as incompa ible i h a f ll belief ha as i h a s rong par ial belief ha ? I  seems
o me ha  he ans er depends on a di erence be een f ll and par ial asser ions o
hich I ha e dra n a en ion else here  [14]: an e ec i el  f ll asser ion has he
e ec  of declaring closed  he lis  of e idence on hich i , or i s rejec ion, migh  be
based. To asser  ha is o asser , in e ec , ha no ne  e idence ill re eal ha
no - . B  a par ial asser ion is al a  rela i e o e idence, in he sense ha  i  is
s bjec  o i hdra al i ho  fa l , sho ld ne  e idence come o hand. This
means ha  o indica e ha  one has some degree (o her han 0 or 1) of par ial belief
ha in response o an asser ion ha , is o indica e ha  one doesn'  hink ha  he
e idence j s i es he asser ion ha . Tha  is, his response amo n s o decli i g 
ag ee ( ha  he asser ion condi ions of  hold), ra her han o di ag eei g ( ha ).
Hence if f ll asser ions are o a rac  a form of dissen  dis inc  from ha  based solel
on assessmen  of asser ion condi ions (as I s gges ed abo e is req ired for he
dis inc ions be een asser ing he and asser ing ha , and be een r h and
asser ibili ), his form of dissen  m s  be gro nded on incompa ibili  of he s rong
kind. (Con ersel , i  doesn'  ma er from he poin  of ie  of de ermina ion of sense,
ha  applied o a par ial asser ion a denial is an indica ion of di erence of opinion
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i h respec  o asser ion condi ions alone; for he sense of I  is probable ha  can
be said o be ha  of  i self.)
The di erences be een hese o no ions of incompa ibili  sho ld no  obsc re
heir similari   bo h res  on he impossibili  of a person s holding par ic lar pairs
of men al a i des a  he same ime. This similari  pro ides he basis of a ni ersal
r le, associa ed i h he sen en ial nega ion opera or hereb  he meaning of a
sen ence con aining s ch an opera or depends on he meaning of he cla se o hich
i  is applied  and his is all ha  he proposed acco n  req ires.
I shall no  a emp  here o deal i h he ario s logical connec i es  disj nc ion,
conj nc ion, and so on  in he same de ail as I ha e in he case of nega ion. B  i
seems reasonable o hope for similar acco n s: in he case of disj nc ion, for
e ample, for an acco n  hich in rea ing disj nc ion as a force-modif ing sen en ial
f nc ion, ne er heless e plains h  hen his f nc ion is applied o a pair of
asser ions, he res l  can i self be considered an asser ion (so ha  in his special case,
he f nc ion can I cons r ed as modif ing sense). The a  in hich s ch an acco n
migh  go is ill s ra ed b  he case of (indica i e) condi ionals. We ha e aken he
condi ional If hen , here  and  are f ll asser ions, o be associa ed i h a
disposi ion o infer from a f ll belief ha o a f ll belief ha . The proposed
acco n  o ld arg e ha  o hold his disposi ion is eq i alen  o holding a cer ain
belief: namel  ha  belief hose beha io ral conseq ences amo n  o a disposi ion
o ignore he possibili  ha  bo h and no - , in assessing one s possible co rse of
ac ion. (In sa ing his, e can make se of he fac  ha  e ha e been able o
cons r e he e ec  of nega ing an asser oric sen ence as a modi ca ion of sense; and
ill pres mabl  rel  on a similar fac  abo  conj nc ion.)
VII
The possibili ies for r le-go erned rela ions of meaning be een s bsidiar  and
canonical ses of cla ses s ch as I  is probable ha  are h s far from e ha s ed b
hose en isaged b  Frege, Geach and Searle. I  is ob io s ha  o claim o be
con incing, a force-modi er acco n  of he meaning of s ch cla ses o ld ha e o
go far be ond an hing o ered here; b  in sho ing ha  i  is possible o make a
s ar , e ha e sho n ha  he Frege arg men  is far from concl si e.
I  migh  ell be asked, ha  ill remain of he no ion of (f ll) asser ion, in he
absence of he cri erion hich he Frege arg men  o ld pro ide? Wha  ill hen
pre en a dis inc ion of meaning being r led a dis inc ion of force? One possible
ans er is implici  abo e: dis inc ions of force are based on dis inc ions in associa ed
men al a i des, so ha  f ll asser ions are hose erances hich charac eris icall
e press (e ec i el ) f ll beliefs. If his is o pro ide a sef l cri erion, i  ill be
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necessar  o e plain ho  f ll beliefs are o be dis ing ished from o her a i des
( i ho , of co rse, sa ing ha  he  gi e rise o f ll asser ions). I  is no  clear
he her beha io ral cri eria alone can do he rick. Ano her approach 
complemen ar , I hink  is o appeal o he pa erns of assen  and dissen  o hich
erance- pes are s bjec . Else here I ha e s gges ed ha  f ll asser ions are bes
regarded as hose erances hich do no  gi e rise o he kind of no-fa l
disagreemen  hich arises (for e ample)  be een speakers ho, ha ing di eren
e idence, reach di eren  concl sions as o he probabili  of some proposi ion. [16] I
seems o me ha  if he Fregean dis inc ion be een sense and force ere o s r i e
a  all he adop ion of heor  of meaning of he kind s gges ed here, i  o ld be in
ir e of being gro nded on some s ch basis.
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